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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the public sector's cost-reducing investment when
there exists the effect of RDspillover. We show that the investment in the mixed oligopoly is
not higher than that in the public monopoly. When the cost-reducing effect of investment for
each firm is the same, the investment in the mixed oligopoly is equal to that in the public
monopoly. In such a case, the emergence of private firms has a positive impact on social
welfare. Our model is an extended version of Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), which study the
RDinvestment by the public sector.
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In recent years, the theoretical investigation of mixed oligopoly has been attracting considerable
attention. In this ﬁeld the authors study a role of the state-owned public ﬁrm in an imper-
fect market. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) demonstrate a possibility of the welfare-improving
privatization, and Matsumura (1998) investigates the partial privatization.
More recently, Nishimori and Ogawa (2002) investigate a strategic cost-reducing investment
by the public sector. They compare the public ﬁrm’s investment between the public monopoly
and the mixed oligopoly, and show that the emergence of private ﬁrms has a negative impact for
the incentive of the investment by the public sector. Cato (2008) generalizes this result. He does
not specify the demand and cost functions, and uses only mild assumptions. Further, he considers
the free entry of private ﬁrms.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the public sector’s cost-reducing investment when
there exists the eﬀect of R&D spillover. That is, the public ﬁrm’s investment reduces not only
the cost of public ﬁrm, but also that of each private ﬁrm. Many empirical studies support the
existence of the eﬀect of technological spillover, which reduces the costs of rival ﬁrms because
of knowledge leaks or imperfect patenting. In this study, it is assumed that the inverse demand
function is linear, and the marginal cost of each ﬁrm is constant. The public ﬁrm’s investment
aﬀects the marginal cost of each ﬁrm. We assume that the marginal contribution of the public
ﬁrm’s investment for each private ﬁrm is not larger than that for the public ﬁrm. It is shown that
the investment in the mixed oligopoly is not higher than that in the public monopoly. When the
cost-reducing eﬀect of investment for each ﬁrm is the same, the investment in the mixed oligopoly
is equal to that in the public monopoly. In such a case, the emergence of private ﬁrms has a
positive impact on social welfare.
Now, we mention other related literature. Brander and Spencer (1983) analyze the strategic
cost-reducing investment under Nash duopoly. The two stage Cournot game with R&D spillover
is studied by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Suzumura (1992). The R&D competition
in a mixed oligopoly is studied by using a patent race model; see Delbono and Denicol` o (1993),
Poyango-Theotoky (1998), and Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of the mixed
oligopoly, and Section 3 presents the main result. Section 4 concludes this paper.
2 Basic Model
We consider n+1 ﬁrms that compete in Cournot fashion. The zero-th ﬁrm is a state-owned public
enterprise that maximizes social welfare. Firm i (i = 1;2;:::;n) is private and seeks to maximize
its proﬁt. The inverse demand function is given by P = a ¡ Q, where P is the price and Q is
the total output. Let the cost function of the state-owned public ﬁrm be C0(q0;I) = c0(I)q0 and
that of a private ﬁrm be C(qi;I) = c(I)qi, where I is the cost-reducing investment by the public
sector. Note that the cost of each private ﬁrm depends on the public ﬁrm’s investment. The cost
expense for the cost-reducing investment is f(I).














1where Πi is ﬁrm i’s proﬁt.
We consider two regimes: (i) public monopoly and (ii) mixed oligopoly. In the public monopoly,
there exists only one state-owned public ﬁrm which maximizes social welfare. In the mixed
oligopoly, there exist n + 1 ﬁrms: one public ﬁrm and n private ﬁrms. Let W P and W M denote
welfares in public monopoly and mixed oligopoly, respectively.
The game is summarized as follows. At the ﬁrst stage, the state-owned public ﬁrm chooses
the investment. At the second stage, given the public ﬁrm’s investment, each ﬁrm chooses output
simultaneously. We use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept.
We present assumptions for cost functions.
Assumption 1. For all I, c0(I) > c(I) > 0.
This assumption requires that for any investment level, the marginal cost of public ﬁrm is
higher than that of the private ﬁrm.
Assumption 2. For all I, c0
0(I) · c0(I) < 0.
According to this assumption, a spillover reduces the cost of each private ﬁrm. Further, this
implies that the marginal contribution of the investment for the public ﬁrm is larger than that
for each private ﬁrm. We believe that this is realistic.
The following assumption requires that f is increasing.
Assumption 3. f0(¢) > 0.
The next assumption guarantees that the second order condition for the public ﬁrm’s maxi-
mization at the ﬁrst stage is satisﬁed.
Assumption 4. c00(¢) > 0, f00(¢) > 0, and f00(¢) is large enough.
Moreover, additional requirements are needed to ensure the interior solutions of the ﬁrst stage
problem.
Assumption 5. limI!0 f0(I) = 0 and limI!1 f0(I) = 1.
3 Results
In this section, we compare the investment in the public monopoly to that of the mixed oligopoly.
In the rest of this paper, we assume that Assumptions 1–5 are satisﬁed.
Public Monopoly The case of the public monopoly can be calculated along the same line as
Nishimori and Ogawa (2002). In the second stage, given I, the public ﬁrm decides its output to
maximize social welfare, and, thus, the optimality condition is: P(q¤
s)¡@C0(q¤
s;I)=@q = 0, where
q¤
s is the function of I. This implies that a¡q¤
s = c0(I). In the ﬁrst stage, the public ﬁrm decides

























0(I) = 0: (2)
The second order condition is satisﬁed by Assumption 4, and Assumption 5 ensures the interia
solution. Let IP denote the optimal investment in the public monopoly. That is, ¡c0
0(IP)q¤
s ¡
f0(IP) = 0. Since a ¡ q¤
s = c0(IP), we have: ¡c0
0(IP)fa ¡ c0(IP)g ¡ f0(IP) = 0.
2Mixed Oligopoly We consider the public ﬁrm’s investment under the mixed monopoly when
the eﬀect of R&D spillover exists. We can solve this game by backward induction. In the second
stage, given the investment of the public ﬁrm, n + 1 ﬁrms choose their outputs. We focus the
equilibrium in which the outcomes of private ﬁrms are symmetric, i.e., q1 = q2 =;:::;= qn. Let
q¤¤
s denote the equilibrium output of the public ﬁrm and q¤¤
p denote that of each private ﬁrm.
Furthermore, Q¤¤ denote the equilibrium total output. From (n + 1) ﬁrst order conditions, we

















By solving these equations, we obtain the equilibrium outputs:
q
¤¤
p = c0(I) ¡ c(I);
q
¤¤
s = a ¡ (1 + n)c0(I) + nc(I);
Q
¤¤ = a ¡ c0(I):
Note that Assumption 1 guarantees the positive production of each private ﬁrm.
In the ﬁrst stage, the public ﬁrm decides its investment. The ﬁrst order condition in the ﬁrst







































0(I) = 0: (4)
Since f00(¢) is large enough, the second order condition is satisﬁed. Further, Assumption 5 ensures
the interia solution. Let IM denote the optimal investment in the mixed oligopoly. That is, the
following equation holds: 2nfc0(IM)¡c(IM)gfc0
0(IM)¡c0(IM)g¡c0
0(IM)fa¡c0(IM)g¡f0(IM) = 0.
Comparison In order to compare investments in two regimes, we derive the derivative of social
welfare in the mixed oligopoly at IP (the optimal investment in the public monopoly). From



















































From this equation, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1–5 are satisﬁed. Then, IP ¸ IM. The equality holds
if and only if c0
0(IP) = c0(IP).
3According to this proposition, the investment in the public monopoly is higher than that in
the mixed oligopoly except for a special case. This result means the robustness of Nishimori and
Ogawa’s (2002) result.
Now, we consider the case where the cost-reducing eﬀect of the investment for each ﬁrm is the
same, i.e., c0
0(¢) = c0(¢). In such a case, we obtain the following irreverence results.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1–5 are satisﬁed. When c0
0(¢) = c0(¢),
(i) the investment in the mixed oligopoly is equal to that in the public monopoly,
(ii) the total output in the mixed oligopoly is equal to that in the public monopoly, and
(iii) the consumer surplus in the mixed oligopoly is equal to that in the public monopoly.
The proof of this proposition is very straightforward. First, since c0
0(¢) = c0(¢), Proposition 1
implies IM = IP. Second, since the price is equal to the public ﬁrm’s marginal cost, the total
outputs are the same between two regimes. Third, when the total outputs are the same, the
consumer surplus is unchanged.
Furthermore, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumption 1–5 are satisﬁed. When c0
0(¢) = c0(¢), social welfare in
the mixed oligopoly is higher than that in the public monopoly.
According to this proposition, when the marginal eﬀect of the public ﬁrm’s investment for
each private ﬁrm is equal to that for the public ﬁrm, the emergence of private ﬁrms has a positive
impact for social welfare.



































where we use Proposition 2 and Assumption 1.
4 Concluding Remarks
A brief summary of the paper is presented.
(i) We incorporate R&D spillover into Nishimori and Ogawa’s (2002) model.
(ii) It is shown that the investment in the mixed oligopoly is not higher than that in the public
monopoly.
(iii) When the spillover eﬀect is extremely strong (c0
0 = c0), the existence of private ﬁrms is
beneﬁcial for social welfare.
4Finally, other relevant research and directions of future work are mentioned. First, the number
of private ﬁrms is exogenous in this paper. There exist several papers of the mixed oligopoly, which
consider the free entry equilibrium.1 In some countries, we often observe a mixed market under
free entry of private ﬁrms. The comparison to the mixed oligopoly free entry is a reminded issue.
Second, R&D investment by the state-owned public ﬁrm is considered in this study. A case of
R&D investment by both the public ﬁrm and private ﬁrms would be an interesting topic for future
research.
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